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RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT? NOTES TOWARD AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH
Reginald Herbold Green
Words mean what I say they mean
- Alice in Wonderland
(The Red Queen)
Aye, but a man's reach much exceed his grasp or what's a heaven for?
- W. B. Browning
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang, but with a whimper.
- T. S. Eliot
Do not go silent into that good night,
But rage, rage against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
Toward Definitional Ground Clearing (Synthesis?)
Discussion of the right to development has regularly become
embrangled in attempts to create a series of rather unreal dichotomies
between traditional political human rights and subsequently articulated
socio-and politico- economic rights. This pseudo cartesian (or pseudo
dialectic) approach tends to obscure a great deal more than it reveals;
except perhaps about some of the participants in the debates. Its
origins - and much of its rhetoric - flow narrowly from the Cold Mr and
more broadly from entrenched versus excluded individual, community and
sub-class interests. In fact many politico-or socio-economic rights have
been formulated - or even legally embodied for millenia. Consider, for
example, the land reform, debt forgiveness and bond labour manumission
provisions of the Jewish 'Jbilee year as set out in the Old Testament.
Individual rights cannot in general be separated either from communal
rights or from a social context. A Lockeian social contract and a
parliamentary democracy both posit a social context and a right of
communities (or at least majorities grouping individuals) to decide as
necessary prerequisites for the existence and exercise of individual
rights to vote or to stand for election. Conversely the right to freedom
from hunger or to an adequate diet (most rights can be formulated either
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positively or negatively) is usually seen as collective, but in practice
necessarily involves actual individuals' access to actual food.
Similarly the debate over individual, group, peoples' and state
(national) rights is a confused one if it is perceived to be about types
of rights as opposed to ways of exercising and enforcing them. The right
to development is ultimately '(basically) a right of human beings. It can
in large measure be exercised only by people interacting and actinq
communally (socially) - in some cases primarily (and in all cases partly)
in conflict with existing state Institutions and power structures. At
the same time, its exercise in any country is constrained by global
political economic, military and other power structures. At the global
level, therefore, the right to development must be struggled for/enforced
by states as representatives (trustees?) of the human beings and peoples
of the states. "Peoples' rights" in this context is somewhat ambiguous -
it has meant the right of colonial peoples to struggle to win a state of
their own, of oppressed peoples to struggle against a state which
systematically denied their exercise of rights and of peoples acting
through their state to seek change at global or regional level. However,
none of these is really outside the individual - communal/social - state
continuum nor does any suggest that the basis.of rights lies elsewhere
than in persons (human beings).
Absolute or conditional is a distinction which may have some
valiarty.bwwever, the absolute are mostly negative formulations of
rights, e.g. freedom from torture (including perhaps freedom from
starvation?). Most rights are conditional, e.g. freedom of speech is
conditioned by "clear and present danger" doctrines both in respect to
shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre and "Carib-Paki bastards go home" in
Brixton. Even more "a fair return to labour" is conditioned both by
personal productivity and, even more, by the average level of production
per person in the economy. rhe arguments turn on what rights should be
conditioned to what degree to protect what other rights, and how fully
the total package of rights can be achieved within objective material
constraints. There is no very evident correlation with whether the right
is "traditional" (e.g. freedom of speech) or socio political (e.g. to
enjoy the fruits of ones labour). If either is employed in a way leading
to a clear and present danger to the rights of others then a case for
limitations arises.
Costless versus costly is a recent - and singularly Unfortunate -
dichotomy. Freedom of speech, or organisation, or ability to remove
officials by majority (community) decision would not be costiess to tilhe
rulers of Poland or the Philippines, occupied Kamp'Jchea or Zaire,
Afghanistan or El Salvador. It ,iould cost them their power in each case
and their lives in several. (Indeed in these cases accepting on a right
of freedom from malnutrition would be less costly for the present
rulers). it is rare that those denying--he validity - or simply refusing
to allow the enjoyment - of a right perceive its e'(srcize to be costless
tln tli:m. Id' PAin did not view torture as a bastime. hot as a imeans to
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consolidate and maintain power, nor kill those who spoke of talking
tortoises from petty irritation, but because - by calling up a well known
historic (if legendary) precedent - they "envisaged the death of the
king" (Kabaka Mutesa in the original case).
Even if one is talking purely of material resource costs the
distinction is less than clear. Freedom from hunger/right to an adequate
diet clearly requires real resources and objectively may well be only
partially attainable in the short term with freedom from starvation the
only practicable immediate target. But police and court abuse of
personal (and sub-class or communal) rights in respect to arbitrary
arrest, torture, fair trial often flows in part from ill paid, ill
equipped, ill trained and inadequately staffed police, prison and court
services. Willingness to release an "under trial" on bail is greater in
countries in which it is possible to find him again at the time for
trial. To overcome this set of factors contributing to the denial of
rights also requires scarce resources and in that sense objectively
competes - as to full achievement - with the full achievement of other
rights.
Unifying versus conflictual is a division overlapping the two
previous ones. Almost any right is in some circumstances and from some
perspectives unifying. (ny genuine right genuinely prepounded aspires
to universality which is a ifferent point. Presumably few would argue
that freedom from torture did not have a claim to universality - and
unconditionality. But states, groups and individuals - who are far more
widely distributed and numerous than we like to admit even to ourselves
do oppose it, rendering it conflictual). In different contexts and from
different perspectives almost any right is conflictual. The right to an
adequate diet in some contexts means restraints on landlords, money
lenders, food merchants, tax collectors, etc. - consider both the
prophets in the Old Testament and medieval bourgeois laws on regrating,
engrossing and forestalling for recognition of such conflict far older
than, and different ideological traditions from, Marxism. The right to
free speech is equally conflictual in most contexts with the those whose
interests would be served (are served) by monopolies of knowledge and
absence of dialogue.
Pragmatic or principled tends to relate to the case put more than to
the right considered. Milton's stirring defence of free speech in
Aereopagitica was basically pragmatic - suppressing the false led to
suppressing much of the true, in open debate the true would usually win
out (and by true Milton meant normative Truth as well as objective
fact). Similarly the Brandt Commission's case against mass poverty at
global level is that the poor are poor producers, customers, payers and
upholders of the peace. But most ardent proponents either of freedom of
speech or of the right to act believe there is a normative as well as a
pragmatic basis. Both Locke and Rawls tend in assuming a type of value
calculus which is utilitarian in the narrow sense to cut themselves off
from the way most real eople live and act out value judgments or choices
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or struggles. Despite criticism about muddling self interest and
morality - a perfectly real danger - it is (as Willy Brandt argues in the
introduction to Struggle for Survival) important to make the moral and
the "common interest" cases for the right to development march together.
As the pairs of the right to a decent diet/not to starve and the
right to freedom of person/from slavery illustrates, almost any valid
right can be argued in pragmatic as well as normative grounds. Bishop
Wilberforce and the other normatively based opponents of the slave trade
would not have secured British legislation against it had they not had
very pragmatic commercial and financial allies whose Interests were
damaged by the trade's continuation. Nor would action have been taken by
several continental European states at the end of the Napoleonic wars
except for British diplomatic pressures flowing from that country's
perception of its own self-interest.
Immediately possible rights can - to some degree - be separated from
those attainable oniy over time. However, which is which depends both on
contexts and on perceptions. The right to an adeouate diet is globally
immediately possible on technical and real resource grounds albeit not on
political commitment and power structure ones. At country level the same
is true of India, the reverse in Tanzania and neither the technical/real
resource nor political basis exists in Zaire. But India is again
different from Zaire in respect to the narrowed form of the right -
freedom from starvation. The central government and a fortiori some
state governments and decision takers do place high importance on
fulfilling it. This is distinctly less the case in Zaire. As a result
freedom from starvation has since independence been an effective right In
Tanzania, largely so in India but often not so in Zaire. Similarly the
right to free speech is possible now - at a somewhat limited level -
anywhere if the political cost is acceptable to those in power, but if it
is read to mean the right of all and each to be able to communicate
effectively to any who are interested in hearing it is not fully achieved
anywhere because of very real technical, institutional and real resource
constraints. Phased movement toward fuller exercise of riohts is not
unknown, for example acertura in Brazil, and-the Humphrey-Hawkins Act on
employment in U.S.A. Indeed it is the normal historic pattern both
cyclically and secularly.
Dividing rights into legally enforceable and not leoally enforceable
has a tendency to be a debater's trick. If the definition of lega]ly
enforceable is that there is a law reouiring or forbidding certain acts
with sanctions for its violation, then to argue that an asserted right Is
not a right because no such law exists invites the answer "then pass an
Act"!. If the point at issue is actual enforcement (or protection of
exercise) of the right, this applies to almost every right in almost
every country whatever legal orotection it enjoys - the variations of
degree are very wice but perfection is very rare.
In any event, protection/enforcement very often does not ultimately
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depend on statute law, for example non-acceptance by the United States of
Central America/Caribbean refugees, where interpretation by officials
(systematically for refugees from "Communist" and against those from
nearby "friendly authoritarian" states) is the dominant factor, and the
ending in Zimbabwe of segregated health/education facilities 18 months
before Acts reouiring them were repealed.
Internationally the problems of enforceability of rights are the
standard ones of Internatlonal law more generally. Because it has
sources beyond and in addition to statutes and because fora for
adjudication and - a fortiori - means of enforcement are limited and
often extra (or pare) judicial, the global is not simply a blowup of the
national. But operationality and enforceability are related to whether a
right is broadly recognized to be valid, its gross violation widely
condemned and continued massive violation often followed by sanctions
(usually extra-judicial) by a significant number of members of the
international community and per contra whether national attempts to
broaden the ability of its people to exercise a right does in fact lead
to international solidarity in the form of practical as well as moral
support.
None of this should be taken to mean that legal formulations, laws
and fora do not matter. Laws do influence both conduct and perception of
norms, legal fora and decisions do give Justification for parallel
enforcement or effectuation when purely judicial means are by themselves
incomplete (e.g. actually getting food to starving people) or inadeouate
(e.g. stopping great - and especially lesser - powers from arbitrary
imprisonment of those who seek to exercise freedom of speech or ecually
arbitrary arming of the 'victims' of land reform and broader political
participation to stage a counter revolution). It is easy - especially
for lawyers - to be too cynical and reductionist about the law and legal
processes. Historically both have been seen to have - and often have had
- something to do with justice, the evolution of its conceptualisation
and struggles to give these aspirations some objective reality.
New or synthesis is more a Question than a dichotomy. Evidently,
numerous aspects of the right to development are embodied in more
traditional rights. Whether all are is much less certain - the
interaction of "packages" of rights may be catalytic and need to be seen
as an interwoven whole (by no means a novel view in the civil rights
tradition):' Further the formulation of rights - even if not necessarily
their basic nature - varies over time and space. The question about
formulations (even -.f ultimately not about rights) is whether they are
approprite and useful not about whether they are "truly new" or regroup
elements already contained in different formulations. A ground clearing
that takes up over a hird of a paper may seem a singularly inappropr.i ate
formulation! In the case of the rioht to development that may not he the
case. Both its proponents and opponents have managed to create vast
clouds of smoke snd sparks which prevent oeneration either of much ]i Mht
for those oeoo'e who would wis;h to see or of munrh hnit fnr .hn1 hLi n
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beings who are - literally - left "out in the cold" (or hot or wet or dry
as the case may be).
Elements in an Operational Definition
One difficulty in framing a definition of a right to development is
that development itself is not easy to define. Especially for the
purpose of formulating a right, the cataloguing of artefacts - e.g.
airports, universities, doctors of law - is not very helpful. Nor is
heavy reliance on certain symbolic or real proxies - e.g. gross domestic
product and its growth - which conceal critical Issues of oroanisation
and distribution. Nor can totaly specificity be achieved - the right to
a decent burial in one's home community is seen as crucial by many people
and in many societies and fuller ability to exercise it as development,
but at that level universality is lost because this concern is clearly
not true of all people and societies. It may well be seen as a part of a
more generally formulated right (for example, 4 below) but by itself it
and other "special formulations" are very much context specific.
The elements noted below have some claim to universality. Fbwever,
they are formulated from the perspective (if not ir the rather more
concrete case and struggle oriented vocabulary) of the pocr (or excluded,
exploited and oppressed). This is a deliberate choice as well as a
concession to spatial limits which prevents multiple phrasings. Richts
need to be (and historically are) formulated primarily in terms o-F--se
who need to enjoy them and are barred from doing so by forces beyond
their control. In the case of the right to development those human
beings, communities, sub-classes are primarily the poor even if,
arguably, some of the rich are also constrained as well.
Six elements seem central:
1. participation (direct or indirect but in either case effective)
in decision taking;
2. particioatifon in enforcement of decisions (whether via the
courts, elections cr some form of withdrawal of support);
3. particiation in production - to have a direct claim on its
fruits (and a direct power to reduce or halt production if that
claim is denied/thwarted);
4. effective access to basic individusl/household consumer noods
(including food, shelter, ciothiln, etc.) primarily from
adequately productive and fairly remunerated employment/self
employment;
5. effective access to hasic puhlic services - especially health,
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6. ability to engage in self-organisation to
implement/enforce/protect the other elements of the right to
development.
This bears a family resemblance to the ILO definition of Basic Needs
- and more to its earlier draft on Basic Human Needs which proved
politically unacceptable. It has little resemblance to minimum material
needs approaches whether those with substantial platonic goodwill - for
example,, Robert MacNamara's - or those which were overtly manipulative -
for example, Nero's bread and circuses.
This formulation and its variants are apparently deceptive to most
readers in two different respects. The first is as to its feasibility
(at least over a twenty year period) on technical and real resource
grounds - which is absolute globally and fairly high in all but a handful
of states given moderate, targeted increases in real resource transfers.
The second is in assuming that it is either politically easy or per se
politically naive. A fairer criticism would be that it is politically
explosive and may in many countries amount to a commitment to a course of
struggle likely to lead to not insubstantial levels of violence.
The cost in terms of real material resources - especially for the
third, fourth and fifth elements is absolutely - and relative to total
resources of poor countries - high. Taken seriously at global level, the
right to development would require substantially greater real resource
transfers.
The costs in terms of power distribution (inevitably leading to some
- in certain cases massive - absolute real material resource losses for
certain persons, interest groups, sub-classes and perhaps states) are
even greater. This is especially true of the sixth element (and often
the third) without which enforceability of the right for those most in
need of ability to exercise it more fully will ultimately remain
dependent on the goodwill, moral perceptions, or calculations of
self-interest of those who have already been able to exercise it and may
well see reasons why its universal exercise will not suit their
interests. This is true locally, nationally and globally. It is not
true that distribution of power is necessarily a zero sum game - if the
redistributed power within a system allows it to produce greater results
(e.g. land reform leading to/making possible much higher output,
international regulation/management of commodity price gyrations reducing
total-costs of instability) then almost all participants can be gainers.
It is true that power redistribution often entails absolute losses for
some and - as exemplified in the 1974-1.984 international economic
dialogue of the deaf - is always perceived as entailing the risk of such
losses by many of the dominant power holders.
- 17 -
Toward Programmatic Operationality
Any right can be defined generally/globally. For any programme at a
concrete place, at a specific time to move toward making that right
effective for particular communities of human beings and the individuals
belonging to them will vary in verbal formulation, specific targets,
priorities, sequences, tactics and time frame. Effective ability to
communicate now usually requires building up "informal" or "open access"
channels but to suppose the Village Voice in Manhattan and
state/foundation funded open access time on North American television are
relevant to Tanzanian villages is about as plausible as to think wall
newspapers and meetings of the residents together are relevant to
Manhattan.
Some priority items of personal/household consumption are fully
culturally bound - for example, the minimum acceptable form of decent
burial which in China and probably much of Africa would appear in the top
five items most poor households would list as basic needs/rights to be
secured. Others are more malleable but by no means either simply
"objective" nor totally fluid, for example, an adequate diet is almost
never defined by actual human beings (including one fancies nutritionists
when eating) solely in terms of technical nutritional standards.
Similarly the form and coding (as partially distinct from content) of
free speech is often culture and context specific, (e.g. British
"parliamentary language" is far from identical to normal standards of
non-slanderous usage both as to inclusion and exclusion).
If participation is taken seriously, initial targets (and strugoles
and tactics) must turn in large part on how poor people and their grouos
perceive reality. This is not to claim that a leader should initiate a
mirror perambulating down a highway nor to say that consciousness raising
is merely a slogan for manipulation. It is to say that a peasant
community may, and may validly, see the initial barriers to an effective
right to development as baboons eating their crops because they have no
say in district government use of funds and lack of pure water because
central government allocations go only to towns. If that is the case in
a specific context, to argue that the "real" problems are rich peasant
exploitation of poor and World Bank lending patterns which entrench the
rich and marginalize the poor peasant will not, no matter whether valid,
do much to further eitner peasant consciousness or concrete action - and
is not consistent with the self-determination strand in the right to
development. (A strict Platonist whose model came from The Republic -
like a reductionist Marxist - would not accept this because ne does not
accept problem identification and programme decisions as properly
participatory by and of the poor rather than haQdled "for" them by
Guardians --whetner Platonic or Politbureaucratic).
However, there are objective considerations which point to the same
conclusion. These overlap the previous category. The poor often do have
better understanding of many objective realities confronting tham than
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most of their unpoor champions. What the starting point is and what
human, institutional, legal and real resource availabilities are must
influence immediate targets, sequences and priorities. To propose air
conditioners as a basic need of the poor in Africa need not be ill
intentioned (highland Africans often find coastal climates more
oppressive than Europeans) but it is either soft headed or wrong headed
on objective resource limitation and priority grounds.
Similarly, acting for people/groups as opposed to assisting them to
act themselves is usually more costly, slower and more accident prone.
To build and maintain a national network of boreholes can certainly make
good the right of access to pure water near household residences and can
- assuming adequate finance, personnel, equipment, geological data and
knowledge of settlement patterns - be done with next to no
participation. But in practice material resource constraints will slow
down the implementation (and even more jeopardise the maintenance) of
such a systematic approach in contrast with one utilising inputs of local
labour, materials, techniques, management and maintenance. That - lower
cost, lower risk of failure to maintain - approach does require local
people's participation and organisation.
A slightly different consideration is that actual programmes,
projects, organisations and institutions remain strong and advance if
and, with few exceptions, only if their beneficiaries have a sustained,
.strong voice in decisions and in implementation plus the ability to
enforce sanctions (whether legal, political, economic or other) on those
who seek to thwart "their" programmes-projects-organisations
-institutions. Therefore, participation and organisation by the
beneficiaries of fuller articulation, enforcement and exercise of the
right to development is not an optional extra but a 'real politik'
necessity.
Further - while one hesitates to describe access to, exercise of and
protection for a right as ever fully attained - the time needed to reach
full implementation of rights must vary with starting points, costs of
achieving them and resources available. To achieve freedom from
malnutrition in Sweden is a shorter term goal than in the U.S.A. or - a
fortiori - Mali. To attain freedom of speech (in a functional not a
formal sense) in Kenya is a longer term goal than in - say Denmark, with
both Algeria and Tanzania arguably in between and Vietnam even longer. A
continuing process reouires a built in dynamic and the most obvious one
in the case of the right to development is the organised participation of
those whose ability to exercise it remains severely limited.
Toward Access and Enforceability
A rioht - if one accepts that rights have a normative base - does not
cease to exist because it is violated even if the violation is legally
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allowed or enforced. 8oth apartheid and Pmin's executions are seen as
gross violations of rights - both have had the backing of law in their
basic thrust if not in each individual case. However, in talking of
rights except in the most abstracted or radical chic senses, It is
necessary to focus on human beings, singly and socially, having effective
access to them and to some means to enforce the continuation and
expansion of that access to (enjoyment of) their rights.
In any particular case this probably should include (after at least
broadly defining the nature of the right and the concrete embodiments of
first steps toward making it effective) several steps:
a. identifying who already enjoys access to the right -
individually, communally, as members of a sub-class (e.g. all
members of most seminars on the right to development presumably
have effective access to the right to an adeouate diet) - and why
they have that access as well as how secure it is;
b. identifying who does not have effective access (e.g. most
"location" residents in Zambia, most refugees), why and how
permanent the denial is (in the two examples both the why and -
perhaps - the how permanently questions have different arswers);
c. in the cases of those with access what powers to enforce th?
right (legally, politically, religiously, by social sanctions,
economically) exist and how strong are they?
d. in the cases of those without effective access why do they not
have (or conceivably have but do not use - probably a rare case)
powers to enforce the right?
e. what routes, measures are in fect identifiable to deal with
exclusion from access and power (possibly separable - Rwanda
refugees in Tanzania have had access to basic services and
self-employment opportunities but their power to enforce tnem -
citizenship - is both subsequent to enjoyment of access and is
granted as a privilege rather than a right)?
f. What duties and what limitations (e.o. on the nor-poor) need to
be imposed to ensure effective and sustainable access for those
who do not now enoy it? How can these he structured to do the
least harm to other rights and to have some chance of
operationality? Freedom to preach rscism can dOny any chance for
effective equality of opportunity to minority communities and
individuals and freedom to amass land can recuire near starvation
of rural new landless, but the ways of preventing either are
varied and have quite vrea impact cn fieedom of speech and
freedom tc enjoy the proceeds of ones labour (and to pursue ones
occupation) more generally.
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It is not always necessary to ask these questions prior to actina -
leaping into action is sometimes appropriate, e.g. when massive
violations of the right to life (whether from legal or paralegal
execution or from starvation) are occurring or likely to occur unless
deterrence is brought to bear. Hbwever, it is usually desirable to do so
as a prelude to (not a substitute for) action. To ask the right
questions - especially as to practicable means - is very often half way
to finding the right answers and a ouarter of the way to initial
implementation.
Organisational and tactical issues relate partly to contexts and
partly to levels. At the global level the main actors will be states;
simply because states are the most powerful actors at that level which
are (potentially and in part actually) positively concerned with the
cluster of issues embodied in the right to development. On the one side
states are the relevant representatives of their peoples in seeking
global level changes and ways to exercise/enforce the right to
development. On the other hand states are actual or potential imposers
of costs/sanctions on other states which grossly violate the right to
development internally. Hlowever, because states are not monoliths led by
individual omnipotent dictators or platonic guardians, actions by local,
regional and crossnational peoples groups and other non-governmental
organisations (ngo's) are relevant in educating, convincing, pressuring
states to include the formulation, 'enactment', exercise and enforcement
of the right to development, and of components and cases under that
rubric, on their agendas and to increase the priority given to them. How
broad front and how state linked such action should be is usually a
tactical question. Anesty is not state-linked in the sense of seeking
state support; it puts moral and publicity pressure on states and
similarly it acts on a specific sub-range of human rights primarily on a
case by case basis. Given its record of success there is no evident
reason to urge Amnesty to change. But other ngo's acting through
different channels (including getting governmental backing), on a wider
(or a different select) range of rights and with emphasis on broader
(using cases as symbols and entry points) fronts with equal effectiveness
could increase Amnesty's impact in its own sphere as well as build uo a
more effective de facto right to development coalition.
Similar considerations apply domestically. Whether the right to
development can be exercised primarily through the state or must be
struggled for against it is an empirical question. The answer is rarely
10OX one or iO the other - at the best tensions exist among sub-classes
in the determination of state policy and between them and the operation
of that policy; at the worst there is usually some leeway via certain
government instrumentalities including but not only courts to limit some
abuses and to gain some freedom to exercise certain rights. But there
are strategic and tactical approaches:
a. organising at local level (perhaps with regional and national
links with similar 'basic' groups and support groups whose
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members are sympathetic and have useful skills or accesses to
publicity and power) to take advantage of interstices within the
structures of a basically hostile or indifferent state;
b. similar organisations acting to oppose specific abuses or win
specific opportunities and/or state support on issues of vital
interest to the 'basic' organisations but individually peripheral
to state institutions or important sub-classes;
c. more nationally organised groups or coalitions confronting state
institutions and/or dominant sub-classes on issues basic to both
sides;
d. similar organisations/coalitions struggling to win a share in
(domination over) the sub-class decision taking coalitions
nationally.
While action at several levels at once is quite likely, logically
these are also sequential elements both in the sense of building up
broader understanding of constraints on self-organisation/action,
experience in working together and knowledge of how the state
institutions and opposing sub-classes operate and in that of having
enough power base to press on to the next stage.
Law and Enforceability
Law - at least statute law - is neither the only nor the ultimate
source of enforceability. This is probably particularly true of the
right to development and of many aspects of it. The right not to starve
has very considerable moral, emotional, cultural and - sometimes -
political force but is rarely legislated directly (it is embodied in mary
laws from the Old Testament Jubilee Year to U.S. food stamp legislation),
nor indeed would it be made readily enforceable solely by that means.
Nor does law provide an inclusive or basic definition of rights even
in principle. (In practice the correspondence is even less - legally
validated rights are often flagrantly violated and rights on which there
are no laws at all more widely enjoyed and honoured). While a body of
Law (as contracted with individual laws) whicn is organically related to
a society's values, practices, traditions, culture may (and usually does)
influence how rights are perceived and enforced, even if it is less than
fully-definitive, it is always less than the totality of perception and
enforcement and may well conflict with other strands in both (especially
so in periods when perceptions and/or power structures shift).
However, this is not the same thing as saying that in general law has
no relationship with (or a negative relationship to, as in laws
entrenching exclusion from rights, e.g. apartheid enforcement legislation
- 22 -
and a not insubstantial number of property 'rights' protection laws)
rights even though that may be true in some cases. Laws are often more
than a simple recapitulation of what exists. They can play a target
setting and norm presenting role as well as providing one avenue toward
enforceability. How fully they can do this depends partly on how much
change, how fast they require, how widely the norms embodied in them are
accepted as having moral validity (including by those who violate them)
and how many holders of how much power put what priority on enforcing
them. The very different effectiveness of U.S.A. and U.K.
anti-discrimination legislation relates in part to such considerations
(especially to a much higher personal acceptance that discrimination is
wrong in the U.S.A., a perception only partly related to education by
legislation and its enforcement) as well as to the very evident greater
technical legal weaknesses of the U.K. legislation.
Law - broadly defined - has several roles in respect to establishing
any right, the right to development included:
a. as an educational tool (in the hands of the would be
beneficiaries of the right);
b. as a defence mechanism (against those who violate the right
protected by existing law even when state initiated enforcement
is unlikely and the state is among the violators who need to be
restrained. This is not so unreal a use as might be supposed.
The tradition of the rechstadt has partial echoes surprisingly
widely as, for example, some - even if not most - South African,
Philippine and Indian cases suggest);
c. as a limitation on actions by the State or by other actors
(either because the state really does accept and will enforce the
law or because it and other actors see a non-legal cost in
breaking the law);
d. as a lever or pressure point (for example, broad declarations on
the right to development embodied in law may form a platform for
criticizing actions/practices/resource allocations which
frustrate their implementation);
e. as a tool for - and a defence of - self-organisation and
participation in respect not only of formal constitutional law
but also of administrative law (including general regulations
whatever their formal status) and of the organisational
embodiment and self-defence of groups seeking access to the right
to development.
f. as a means of impcsiq*a sanction (cost) or erecting an
injunction (barrier surt nnuntable only at a cost) against a
vToTh~or of some emoodi,,ent or aspect of a right.
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The basic problems with the use of law in these ways are at least
fourfold:
1. access to the law - both intellectual and financial - is often
easiest for those who already enjoy effective rights and/or wish
to deny them to others;
2. use of laws to bind a state which does not in practice agree with
them has distinct limitations beyond individual cases or
secondary issues - i.e. one can hope to gain a few degrees of
freedom sometimes but not to challenge the basic interests of
dominant decision takers who will ultimately respond by coercing
the courts/lawyers or changing the law;
3. laws in a broad - and sometimes loose - way do represent the
values, goals and interests of those (individuals, sub-classes,
corporate bodies) in pow whereas the right to development is
primarily concerned witFhaltering access to - inter ella - power
and therefore requires changes in the laws before it can depend
on their enforcement as a generally positive force;
4. the majority of lawyers (including judges) in most countries are
not poor and do - personally and as a profession or sub-class -
have fairly effective access to the right of development. Thus
both "what we have we hold" and especially "invisibility" (or
non-comprehension) of the poor and their assertion of a riaht to
development are more often the rule than the exception in legal
circles.
Again, these limitations apply locally, nationally and
internationally/locally in somewhat different ways. Locally the
immediate conflict is likely to be primarily with particular members of
domestic sub-classes (for example, landlords, money lenders), particular
state institutional branches (for example, police, courts, foresters,
land registration offices) and particular foreign enterprises which
exploit (for example, plantations, especially expanding land engrossing
ones) or exclude (for example, foreign fishery fleets which de facto
monopolize marine resources). At that level the overall state structure
and the overall dominant sub-class coalition are usually at one remove
from the perceived cutting edge and the global political economic system
at a second remove. Nationally the national structures and coalitions
are the immediate sources of the obstacles and the global at one remove
while at the international level it is at the cutting edge. This not
incidentally explains a parado, - at the global level states which are
domestically by no means champions of the right to development of their
own people may very well be quite genuine proponents of global level
changes necessary (but evidently not sufficient) for the right to
development to be achieved in their countries.
None of these limitations is either absolute or insoluble.
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Collectively they can be formidable. Ibwever, considerations 2 and 3,
once portions of the right to development have adequate power bases to
have been enacted as law and to have substantial institutional/political
backing toward enforcement/effective exercise begin to operate in the
inverse (pro-right to development) way. At that point the last problem
may be eroded - with a more diversified group of entrants into the legal
and paralegal professions - or become greater with lawyers the guardians
of the last ditch against more effective access to the right to
development what ever lawmakers and the poor may say or legislate. Or
they may play a mixed role upholding certain aspects of the right to
development (e.g. freedom of speech and of independent organisation,
right to a fair trial with defence advisers of ones own choosing) which
they see as particularly critical, at least partly because they see them
as at risk for themselves, but opposing others (e.g. greater access to
ability to produce enough to live or greater access to non-traditional
judicial fora) which they perceive as threatening their own interests or
simply feel to be irrelevant (as they may be to themselves in their
personal and sub-class capacities). Ghana in recent years would appear
to exemplify such a process. It is not accidental that revolutions
fairly generally take a dim view of individual lawyers, judges and laws;
and not uncommonly of the existing legal profession and legal system as a
whole and sometimes of the rule and role of law generally. This may be
not accidental, but it is not desirable either, since laws and especially
"law" are among the least bad and least ineffective ways of cresting and
maintaining institutional and procedural frameworks within which
effective access to all rights (including the right to development) can
be enjoyed.
